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This study investigated age differences in generalization of causal value employing
similarity as a cue to causality. Exemplars from six food categories (A+, B-, C+, D-. E+,
F-) were presented to both young and older adults in two contiguous training phases.
Training Phase 1 included exemplars from categories A+, B-, C+, D-. Training Phase 2
included exemplars from A+, B-, E+, F-. Foods in the “+” categories were paired with an
outcome of sickness and foods in the “-” categories were not paired with sickness. Tests
of causal judgment and exemplar recognition were conducted. For causal judgment,
individual exemplars experienced during training and novel exemplars from all six
categories were presented. For categories A+ and B-, the categories experienced in both
training phases, young and older groups generalized the causal value to the category label
and to all exemplars regardless of whether they were experienced in training or were
novel. For categories experienced only once in training (C+, D-, E+, F-), both groups
were better able to successfully judge causal value for experienced exemplars than novel
exemplars. For young and older adults, experience made a difference in the ability to
generalize causal value. Experienced and novel exemplars were also presented for
recognition. Participants in both age groups showed a false memory effect for individual
exemplars from the more experienced categories (A+, B-) suggesting that the process that
allowed them to generalize causal value also interfered with their memory for individual
exemplars. There was a difference between the younger and older groups for the
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categories that were only experienced once in training (C+, D-, E+, F-). In this case,
younger participants showed better recognition than older adults for the individual
exemplars. Older adults showed the same false memory effects for these categories as
they showed for categories A+ and B-. These findings suggest that older adults generalize
causal value as well as younger adults, but they are less able to distinguish individual
exemplars. This discrepancy may be explained by differences in ability to use verbatim
and gist. Older adults’ reduced verbatim processing leads to default gist encoding that
enables them to focus on category level features but not process detailed exemplar
identity (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). Younger adults appear to have a flexibility that
enables them to encode and retrieve both category-level gist and verbatim individual
exemplar features when the task calls for it.
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CHAPTER 1
Literature Review
Understanding causal relationships is imperative to humans. The ability to
determine causality imbues the world with predictability and order. The desire to make
sense of our world by examining causal influences is demonstrated, not only by the
efforts of philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists, but by all humans. Although
causal influence can only be observed indirectly, we determine cause and form causal
beliefs from the patterns we perceive in the world. Determination of cause is so
fundamental and pervasive that humans possess a mental system of inference with the
propensity to generate a cause even when one is not perceived through the senses
(Newberg & d’Aquili, 2000). This inferential system uses mental processes to group or
associate ideas and representations of events and objects. English and Scottish
philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries identified contingency,
contiguity, and similarity as the basic laws of association (Hume, 1739/1969). These
concepts form the basis of modern theories of learning and memory. How we employ the
associative learning tools of contingency, contiguity, similarity to infer causality is a
persistent and pervasive question. Additionally, the developmental and mental factors
that affect the perception of causality and lead to veridical causal judgment are of interest
in contemporary psychological study.
Associative Processes in Young and Older Adults’ Causal Learning
Theories of associative learning accept contingency, contiguity, and similarity as
fundamental to causal learning. Contingency, the frequency and consistency with which
potential causes (cues) occur contiguously with an effect (outcome), can be expressed as
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a 2 X 2 contingency table (see Figure 1). Cell A represents the frequency with which both
the cue and outcome occur (C O). Cell B represents the frequency with which the cue
occurs but the outcome does not occur (C ~O). Cell C represents the frequency with
which the cue does not occur, yet the outcome occurs (~C O). Cell D represents the
frequency with which neither the cue nor the outcome occurs (~C ~O). If, in real life
experience or over a set of experimental trials, it is more probable that the outcome
occurs in the presence of the cue [P(O|C)] than in the absence of the cue [P(O|~C)], the
contingency is positive. If the probability is greater that the outcome occurs in the
absence of the cue [P(O|~C)] than in the presence of the cue [P(O|C)], the contingency is
negative. There is a non-contingent relationship between cue and outcome if the
probability of the outcome occurring in the presence of the cue equals the probability of
the outcome occurring in the absence of a cue [P(O|C)] = [P(O|~C)].

Figure 1. Example of a 2 x 2 contingency table.
Young adults are quite proficient at assessing these contingent probabilities and at
using contingency to make causal judgments (Mutter & Plumlee, 2009; Mutter &
2

Williams, 2004). However, there is a growing body of evidence that supports an agerelated decline in older adults’ ability to successfully judge causal contingency (Mutter,
Haggbloom, Plumlee, & Schirmer, 2006; Mutter, Strain, & Plumlee, 2007; Mutter &
Williams, 2004). In a set of four experiments, Mutter and Williams (2004) varied the
contingency between pressing the computer spacebar and the appearance of a triangle on
the monitor screen and found that older adults were not able to detect these contingencies
as well as younger adults. For Mutter and Williams’ causal learning task, bar-pressing
was either generatively linked to the appearance of the triangle (positive contingency) or
withholding bar-pressing was preventatively linked to the appearance of the triangle
(negative contingency) Age differences were significantly more pronounced for negative
than positive contingencies. Whereas younger adults were able to estimate both positive
and negative contingencies, older adults were unable to distinguish negative
contingencies from non-contingent events.
When contingency evidence is acquired through description as opposed to direct
experience (i.e. bar-pressing), age differences in causal contingency judgment remain.
Mutter and Plumlee (2009) presented written causal judgment problem descriptions based
on nature, social interactions, and abstract scenarios. They found that when evidence was
provided in descriptive form, older adults judged positive (generative) contingencies as
successfully as younger adults. However, when the relationship between cue and
outcome was negative (preventative contingency) older adults were significantly less
accurate. Older adults appeared to pay attention only to the information in Cell A (C O).
Employing this Cell-A rule, they ignored cells that require taking absent information into
consideration. This is further evidence that the observed deficit in older adults’
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contingency learning may be related to an inability to successfully estimate the frequency
for the contingencies in which the absence of a cue results in an outcome (Mutter,
DeCaro, & Plumlee, 2009: Mutter et al., 2006; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Plumlee,
2009; Mutter & Williams, 2004)
Contiguity, an additional cue to causality, describes the proximal relationship
between a cause and effect. Although prior experience can influence expectation and
subsequent determination of cause, in general the timing or physical location of a
potential cause and a perceived effect must be contiguous (Allan, Tangen, Wood, &
Shah, 2003). When cue and outcome are not contiguous, causal ratings for events
converge toward zero (Mutter et al., 2009). When a cue and outcome are contiguous,
young adults accurately assess causal relationships, but the accuracy of their causal
judgment declines as the time between a cue and outcome increases. For example, an
inter-stimulus interval of 2 seconds reduces young adults’ causal judgment and an
interval of 4 seconds eliminates it (Shanks & Dickinson, 1991; Shanks, Pearson, &
Dickinson, 1989).
Younger adults can use temporal contiguity to help learn a causal relationship
whether that relationship is generative (an action causes a result) or preventative (the
absence of an action causes a result). Older adults, on the other hand, can use temporal
contiguity to help learn a generative causal relationship but have difficulty learning the
same relationship when the cause is preventative (Mutter et al., 2009). Mutter et al.
presented younger and older adults with a problem in which they were to judge the causal
relationship between pressing the computer spacebar (cue) and the appearance of a
triangle on the computer screen (outcome). In two experiments, the temporal continuity
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varied between 4000 ms and 50 ms. Younger and older adults judged the causal
relationship between the instrumental response and outcome to be stronger when they
were immediately contiguous than when there was a delay. Both groups were able to use
contiguity as a cue to causality when the cause was generative, both groups showed
sensitivity to the difference in contingency for generative causes, and both groups
expressed stronger causal judgment for the more contiguous outcome. However, there
was a difference in the two groups’ ability to use contiguity to assess causal relationships
when the cause was preventative. When the appearance of the triangle was contingent on
the participant not pressing the spacebar, the degree of contiguity had no effect on older
adults’ judgments (Mutter et al., 2009). Thus, unlike younger adults, older adults were
unable to use temporal contiguity as a cue to causal relationships when the cause was
preventative.
In summary, older adults appear to have a deficit in using contingency and
contiguity as cues to causality when there is a negative contingency or preventative
relationship between a cue and outcome whether the information is provided through
description or experience. It appears that older adults have more trouble than young
adults making accurate causal judgments when a cue or outcome is absent. When it is the
absence of a response that leads to outcome, not even strong contiguity helps older adults
learn causal relationships.

5

Aging and Causal Learning for Absent Cues
In any causal learning situation, there are an infinite number of cues that are
absent and completely irrelevant. There may also be absent cues that are perfectly
causally relevant – the true cause of the outcome or effect. According to Hearst (1991),
absent cues include physical cues that are expected but have been deleted or fail to occur.
In addition, absent cues include cognitive representations of events or objects that must
be retrieved from memory, those that are imperceptible, and those that must be imagined
because we were absent in their presence. Hearst points out that humans (as well as other
species) process objects and events that are currently present differently from those that
are currently absent. Joint occurrences of cue and outcome are given more credence than
occurrences where a cue is not presented with the outcome and the addition of a cue is
perceived more readily than the deletion of the same cue. This tendency to focus on
present versus absent stimuli also leads to a phenomenon in learning known as the
“feature positive effect” where the presence of a cue as a predictor is learned more
successfully than the absence of a cue (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1970). For instance,
pigeons more readily learn that the presence of a dot on a keylight (feature positive)
predicts food than they learn that an absence of a dot on a keylight (feature negative)
predicts this outcome.
Humans also show the feature-positive effect. In order to examine age differences
for this phenomenon, Mutter et al. (2006) compared older adults’ and younger adults’
performance in feature-positive and feature-negative discrimination learning tasks. This
task used geometric figures as the feature. The presence of a triangle, for example,
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constituted the correct response in a feature-positive discrimination. The absence of a
triangle constituted the correct response in a feature-negative discrimination. As
expected, both younger and older participants learned the feature-positive discrimination
faster than the feature-negative discrimination, demonstrating the feature-positive effect
in their causal learning. However, younger adults learned more quickly than older adults.
Subsequently, participants were required to transfer their knowledge of the featurepositive or feature-negative rule to a new discrimination problem. Following initial
feature-positive training, younger adults’ transfer performance on both feature positive
and feature negative tasks improved. Younger adults were also able to transfer
knowledge gained in feature-negative training to new feature-positive problems as well
as new feature-negative problems. Older adults were able to transfer knowledge gained in
feature-positive training to a new feature-positive task, but, unlike younger adults, they
were unable to transfer knowledge from a feature-negative task to a new problem (Mutter
et al., 2006).
An experimental addition made the Mutter et al. (2006) results even more
elucidating. They used a third group composed of young adults who were distracted by
number memorization during the learning tasks. The distracted young participants
performed as if they were older. These findings suggest that working memory capacity is
an important factor in the processing of absent cues. The demands of retrieving and
representing an absent cue, maintaining that representation, and manipulating it may
exceed capacity in individuals with reduced working memory. The difficulty observed in
older adults causal learning for negative or preventative cue-outcome relationships may
be due to the additional resources required to process absent cues.
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Absent cues also make association-based causal judgment difficult. Retrospective
revaluation is a paradigm that allows for the investigation of causal learning about
association-based absent cues. The two most frequently encountered and tested
retrospective revaluation effects are recovery from overshadowing and backward
blocking. Recovery from overshadowing, described by Kaufman and Bolles, (as cited in
Dickinson & Burke, 1996) occurs when new causal information about a presented cue
leads to an increase in the causal value of an associated absent cue. For example, if rice
and beans are eaten together and cause an allergic reaction (AB+) and subsequently beans
are eaten alone and do not cause an allergic reaction (B-), the causal value of rice (A) will
increase. Backward blocking is the second scenario. For example, if shrimp and grits
(CD+) are eaten together and cause an allergic reaction and subsequently grits (D+) are
eaten alone and cause an allergic reaction, the causal value of shrimp (C) will decrease.
Both retrospective revaluation effects have been produced in human participants
using an allergy-prediction scenario (Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Mutter, Atchley, &
Plumlee, in press). Younger adults consistently revalue absent cues when new
information about presented cues demands it (Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Mutter et al., in
press). However older adults show a deficit in their ability to revalue absent cues. Mutter
et al. conducted a series of four experiments using the allergy prediction paradigm to
evaluate older adults’ recovery from overshadowing. Additionally, their experiment
investigated the effects of providing working memory support on the ability of older
adults to learn causal relationships for absent cues. In Experiment 1, when first presented
with unrelated food pairs resulting in allergic reaction (AB+) and subsequently presented
with information that food B did not cause the allergic reaction (B-), older adults showed
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no ability to revalue the absent cue A. For Experiment 2, food pairs were constructed that
“went together” (steak and potatoes). Presumably, a food that is already associated with
another would be more likely to cue that food in its absence and this previous and strong
association would reduce the working memory load for older adults. Despite having the
support of previously associated pairs, older adults still did not retrospectively revalue the
causal value of the absent cue. For Experiment 3, more training trials were added to
ensure that the differences were not due to a need for additional learning experience in
the older group. The results did not differ from Experiment 2. Finally, in Experiment 4
the “absent” cue was presented as a non-salient (grey-toned and reduced size) icon. With
this manipulation, older adults did show retrospective revaluation of the “absent” cue.
Mutter et al. (in press) suggest that age-related deficits in preventative causal learning and
retrospective revaluation may result from older adults attenuated ability to successfully
bind, or associate, the cues together. The presentation of one cue does not activate the
representation of the absent cue. But when the “absent” cue was present as a non-salient
reminder, older adults were able to revalue its causal value.
Current Study
The findings from these studies show that older adults’ causal learning, like that
of young adults, is sensitive to variations in contingency and contiguity when cues are
present in the environment. In addition, older adults are able to assess and revalue the
causal value of present cues. However, it appears that older adults are particularly
insensitive to contingency and contiguity when the absence of a cue predicts an event and
they are less able to assess and change the causal value of absent cues. Because older
adults have this particular deficit in causal learning, an pertinent question is whether they
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can use another law of association, similarity, to successfully make causal judgments
about absent cues. There has been no direct research on this question.
Similarity, like contingency and contiguity, can be a basis for successfully
determining causal relationships. Although similarity is not completely synonymous with
categorization, similarity is accepted by many theorists as one basis for category
formation (Goldstone, 1994). Categorization allows for processing the most information
with the least possible cognitive effort and greatly simplifies the overwhelming task of
organizing the infinite number of possible stimuli into more easily understandable
groupings (Rosch, 2002). Humans, without conscious effort and beginning at a very early
age, assign objects and events to categories (Cohen, 2003). The individual members of a
category, although distinguishable, are treated as equivalent. This stimulus equivalence
extends to causal judgment. Cause is a central feature in determining category
membership (Ahn, Kim, Lassaline, & Dennis, 2000). Thus, when one member of a
category is an assumed cause of an effect, causal value will generalize to the other
members as a result of their similarity to the causal cue (Mervis & Rosch, 1981).
Although similarity is understood to be a cue to causality, little research has been
done on the use of stimulus equivalence in the generalization of causal value. However, a
recent study by Griffiths & Mitchell (2008) addresses this issue. They investigated the
causal judgment of younger adults using a typical human causal learning task that
employed exemplars from food categories. Exemplars from some categories consistently
caused illness and exemplars from other categories consistently caused no illness. For
each exemplar, participants predicted the outcome and then received feedback as to
whether or not it caused illness. Participants were expected to use category membership
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and generalization to generate and mentally represent the absent food category from the
presented exemplars. They were then expected to use similarity to predict the causal
value of new exemplars from those categories at test. Griffiths and Mitchell’s young
adults learned to discriminate the categories that caused illness from those that did not
and they were able to generalize causal value from the presented exemplars to the
category. Furthermore, they used similarity, as defined by category membership as a cue
to causality for new exemplars. When tested for individual exemplar recognition,
participants recognized significantly fewer exemplars from categories with which they
had had the most experience (seen the most individual exemplars). The more successfully
that causal value was generalized to the category, the poorer the recognition for the
individual category members.
In the current study, Griffith and Mitchell’s (2008) procedure was used to
determine whether older adults can use similarity to generalize causal value to the absent
cue category and to novel category exemplars. Although older adults have a deficit using
contingency or contiguity in causal learning for absent cues, evidence from research on
aging and semantic priming suggests that they may be able to successfully use similarity
to generalize causal value to absent cues. For example, in a study on aging and category
priming, Light and Albertson (1989) presented young and older participants with 50word study lists composed of three category members from each of six different
categories and 32 non-related filler words. Participants were asked to rate the meaning of
each word as pleasant or unpleasant. After a delay period, participants were then given
six category labels and asked to generate eight exemplars for each category. Exemplars of
three of the categories had been encountered within the study list and three were
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unstudied categories. After this task, a cued recall test was administered. Younger and
older adults were equally likely to provide the exemplars that they had seen on the study
list when asked to generate exemplars. This category priming occurred despite the fact
that the exemplars used were not the most frequently named exemplars of the categories.
For cued recall, the results were different. Younger adults were more successful in
explicitly remembering the individual items encountered in the study lists.
Young and older adults also perform similarly on a semantic priming task using
category exemplars (Burke, Diaz, & White, 1987). Semantic priming is typically assessed by
presenting a prime word and measuring the speed with which a participant can make a lexical
decision about subsequently presented targets. Target words that are associated with the
prime are recognized faster than non-related words. If the word “doctor” is the prime, the
subsequent target word “nurse” will be recognized more quickly as a word than “daisy”.
Burke et al. (1987) compared younger and older adults’ priming performance in a task where
participants were given two category names (tree, vegetable) and were asked to make lexical
decisions about subsequently presented targets. The category prime was a clue to what the
target category would be if the target was indeed a word. Targets consisted of non-word and
word exemplars from either the primed category or another category. Some categories
predicted target exemplars from that category (tree-ELM). Some categories predicted target
exemplars from another category. For example, the category vegetable might predict
exemplars from the category animal (vegetable-DOG). Although younger adults had faster
response times than older adults in lexical decision, the older adults showed an undiminished
level of priming. In addition to this evidence that older adults consistently and robustly show
priming at a level equal to younger adults, Myerson, Ferraro, Hale, and Lima (1992) found
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that older adults produce slightly stronger priming effects than younger adults. Although
these differences are not significant in individual studies, Myerson et al.’s meta-analysis
revealed a priming advantage for older adults. Burke et al. also found that both younger and
older adults showed priming to category members that were uncommon and thus weakly
related exemplars for the given categories. However, older adults showed significantly
poorer results than younger participants when they were asked to recall the categories and
words presented (Burke et al., 1987).
Finally, there is no difference between younger and older adults performance on the
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun, Wingfield,
Rosen, & Blanchard, 1998). In the DRM procedure a list of related words is presented and
memory for the list is assessed. All the individual list words converge semantically on a nonpresented critical lure. For example, thread, pin, sewing, sharp, point, pricked, thimble,
haystack, pain, hurt, and injection all converge on the non-presented critical word needle.
When memory for the list is assessed, the non-presented critical lure is “remembered” as
often as words actually presented in the middle of the cue series. Using the DRM procedure,
researchers have shown that false memory for strongly associated non-presented cues occurs
at about the same rate in older adults as in young adults (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun et
al., 1998). The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) procedure is similar to the procedure
employed by Griffiths and Mitchell (2008) to generate a food category name by presenting
strongly associated exemplars. Specifically, the non-presented critical lure in DRM is
associated with each of the words on the presented list and is automatically activated. In the
same way, each member of a category automatically activates the associated category name.

13

The absent critical lure in DRM and the absent category names are both semantically
associated with presented words and become activated even in their absence.
Older adults have a deficit in the ability to use absent cues when making causal
judgments (Mutter et al., in press; Mutter et al., 2009; Mutter et al., 2006; Mutter & Plumlee,
2009; Mutter et al., 2007; Mutter & Williams, 2004). However, evidence that older adults
show robust semantic priming effects suggests that they should successfully generalize
causal value to semantically related absent cues such as category label and related exemplars
(Burke et al., 1987; Hutchison, Balota, Cortese, & Watson, 2008; Light & Albertson, 1989;
Myerson et al., 1992). Using the procedure devised by Griffiths and Mitchell (2008), it was
possible to explore the effects of age on the ability to use similarity to identify the absent cue
category label from exemplars that resulted either in allergic reaction or no allergic reaction,
to generate the category label from the exemplars, and to use the category label to generalize
causal value to new category members. It was expected that if older adults have the same
deficit in their ability to employ absent cues in a paradigm based on similarity as they do in
paradigms using contingency and contiguity, they would not be successful in generalizing
causal value. If, on the other hand, similarity functions like semantic priming to
automatically activate related knowledge, it was expected that older adults would generate
the absent cue category label and extend causal value to all exemplars of the category.
Although older adults may be successful at generalizing causal value, they are
less likely to show successful exemplar recognition. Griffiths and Mitchell’s (2008)
young participants showed reduced recognition for exemplars from the categories with
which they had the most experience in training. Griffiths and Mitchell suggested that the
more successfully causal value is generalized to the category label, the less likely it is that
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individual exemplars will be remembered. Results from Verfaellie, Rapcsak, Keane, and
Alexander (2004) predicted that older adults would perform similarly. They found, in a
group of normal control participants (mean age 57.6), that the larger the number of
category exemplars presented, the larger the number of recognition false alarms. Burke et
al. (1987) found that older adults showed reduced recall for individual exemplars
subsequent to the category-priming task. In the DRM paradigm, older adults falsely
remember the non-presented critical lure at the same rate as younger adults, but they
remember presented cues at a reduced rate (Norman & Schacter, 1997; Tun et al., 1998).
Given this evidence of older adults’ reduced memory for presented exemplars and
Myerson et al.’s (1992) findings that older adults show enhanced priming, it seemed
likely that older adults would show reduced exemplar recognition even for the
nonrepeated categories
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CHAPTER 2
Method
Design and Participants
This study received expedited approval by the Western Kentucky University
Human Subjects Review Board on 21 September 2009 and expedited continuing approval
on 26 July 2010.The design of the study was a 2 (age group: younger vs. older) X 2
(pairing: outcome vs. no outcome) X 3 (category presentations: one early vs. one late vs.
two) X 2 (status of exemplars: old vs. new) mixed factorial. Age was a between subjects
variable. The pairing with or without outcome, number of category presentations, and old
or new status of exemplars were within subjects. Causal value judgment and exemplar
recognition were dependent measures.
Twenty-four older adults (mean age: 69.13) and 24 younger adults (mean age:
20.42) were recruited as participants. Using names randomly taken from the Bowling
Green, Kentucky voter registration rolls or the directory of retired Western Kentucky
University faculty, letters were sent to recruit prospective older adult participants.
Persons who indicated interest in participation by calling the Cognition Laboratory were
screened by telephone. This screening included the Mini Mental State Evaluation
(MMSE) and a medical history. History of injury, condition, or medication that could
have impacted cognitive ability or failure to pass the MMSE were reasons for exclusion
from the study. All older adults who meet the criteria and agree to participate were paid a
small stipend for their time. Younger adults were recruited through the established
Western Kentucky University Psychology Department Study Board. They received
required class credit or extra credit for their time. History of injury, condition, or
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medication that could have impacted cognitive ability were reasons for exclusion from
the study, however, younger adults were not given the MMSE screening.
Younger and older participants provided demographic information and completed
a battery of individual difference tasks. Neither group of participants was deliberately
recruited for equal ethnic, minority, or gender representation, as this was not central to
the hypothesis of this experiment. The demographic statistics for the university and
community indicated that the majority of both groups of participants would be Caucasian.
Based on these statistics, it was expected that participants of African American descent
were to constitute approximately 10% of the participant pool and other minorities were to
represent less than 10% of the volunteers. Reflecting the usual pattern of volunteer
participation at the university, twice as many young female participants were expected as
males. Our sample of participants, both from the community and the university, was
approximately representative of these population expectations.
Materials
Previously, ten younger and ten older adults participated in a pilot study to
determine which food categories and exemplars would be best suited to the population of
young and older participants in our geographical area. Griffiths and Mitchell’s (2008)
procedure was used to generate exemplars for these categories. The instructions used
were those employed by Howard (Battig & Montague, 1969; Howard, 1980). Following
the protocols used by Griffiths and Mitchell and Howard, ten younger and ten older
participants were given the category labels alcoholic beverage, fish, fruit, meat, nonalcoholic beverage, seafood, substance for flavoring food, and vegetable. They were
asked to generate as many members of the category as possible in 30 seconds. Our young
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and older participants named similar food category exemplars in similar order. The
exemplars produced in the pilot study were then compared with the exemplars used by
Griffiths and Mitchell and the normed Van Overschelde, Rawson, and Dunlosky (2004)
lists used by Griffiths and Mitchell in developing their category exemplar lists. From this
comparison, alcoholic beverages, fruits, meats, non-alcoholic beverages, seafood, and
vegetables were chosen as the six food categories for the current study.
An average value was calculated for each pilot exemplar from the six categories
by weighting the frequency and order with which each was given as a category member.
The exemplars with the highest average values from these six categories were retained.
A representative rank was then determined for these exemplars by ordering them
according to the Van Overschelde et al. (2004) norms. This representative rank was used
as a proxy for typicality. The same process was followed for the alcoholic beverage, fruit,
non-alcoholic beverage, and vegetable lists. For categories not included in the Van
Overschelde lists (meat, seafood), pilot-derived weights were used to determine the
representative typicality order. This resulted in a list of 20 exemplars, arranged by
representative typicality (number one, most typical, through number 20, least typical), for
each category (See Appendix A).
To achieve approximately equivalent overall typicality levels for exemplars used
in the training and test phases, sets of exemplars with average representative typicality
ranks were designated. Each 20-item list of category exemplars was assigned to four sets
as follows: set one was composed of exemplar numbers 1, 8, 11, 14, and 17; set two was
composed of exemplar numbers 2, 5, 12, 15, and 18; set three was be composed of
exemplar numbers 3, 6, 9, 16, and 19 and set four was composed of exemplar number 4,
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7, 10, 13, and 20 (See Appendix B). The use of these sets was counterbalanced across the
phases of the experiment (Training Phase 1, Training Phase 2, Causal Judgment Test, and
Exemplar Recognition) to ensure that each phase contained exemplars of varied
representative typicality (See Appendix C).
The six food categories, designated with the letters A+, B-, C+, D-, E+, and F-,
were assigned to six orders according to the schedule shown in Appendix D. Categories
were counterbalanced over cue types such that across participants, each category was
presented as each cue type. The schedule of categories A-F was randomly assigned for
Order 1. Positions for Orders 2 - 6 were determined by progressing the random
assignment one category forward for each successive order. Assigned category
exemplars were randomly presented for each phase. Exemplars from the food categories
that assumed the A+, C+, and E+ positions were paired with the sickness outcome and
those that assumed the B-, D, and F- positions were nonpaired categories that resulted in
health (See Appendix D).
The causal learning task consisted of two training phases and two test phases.
There were five blocks in each training phase and five different foods from each of four
categories were presented in each block, comprising a total of 20 food exemplars
presented in each training phase. For example, the A+ category might have been fruits
and exemplars presented might have been apple, orange, banana, pineapple, and mango.
The B- category might have been meats and exemplars might have been bacon, hot dog,
pheasant, pork, and turkey. In Training Phase 1, the participants were presented with
exemplars from categories A+, B-, C+, and D-. C+ and D- constituted early-presented
nonrepeated categories. Training Phase 2 included five novel exemplars from repeated
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categories A+ and B- and five exemplars from categories E+ and F-. E+ and Fconstituted late-presented nonrepeated categories. A+ and B- constituted repeated
categories. No individual exemplar was presented more than once during the training
phases. Causal Judgment ratings comprised the first test phase. Participants were
presented with ten exemplars from each category. Five of these were seen during
training and five were new. The five old exemplars for categories A and B were
randomly chosen from the 10 exemplars presented over the two training phases. For
categories C, D, E, and F, the five exemplars seen in training constituted the five old
exemplars. Exemplar recognition comprised the second test phase. In this phase all 120
exemplars (20 from each of the six categories) were presented. Participants were asked to
determine whether or not each exemplar was presented during training. For categories A
and B, 10 exemplars would have been seen during training. For categories C, D, E, and F,
five exemplars would have been seen in training. Table 1 shows the skeletal design of the
experiment.
Procedure
All participants, regardless of age, received the same procedure. Each was tested
individually in the Cognition Laboratory in a single session lasting no longer than three
hours. A short break was provided approximately halfway through the session.
Participants were first apprised of the informed consent procedure and asked to carefully
read and complete the relevant form. A biographical and health information form was
also completed. This provided data on education, marital and socio-economic status,
current health, and detailed description of medications. In addition, each participant was
read the Cognition Laboratory general overview.
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Table 1
Design of Study
Experiment Phase

# of trials

Categories

# of exemplars

presented
Training
Phase 1

Phase 2

20

20

A+

5

B-

5

C+

5

D-

5

A+

5

B-

5

E+

5

F-

5

Old A

5

Old B

5

Old C

5

Old D

5

Old E

5

Old F

5

New A

5

New B

5

New C

5

Test
Causal Judgment

60
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Recognition

120

New D

5

New E

5

New F

5

Trained A

10

Trained B

10

Trained C

5

Trained D

5

Trained E

5

Trained F

5

Nontrained A

10

Nontrained B

10

Nontrained C

15

Nontrained D

15

Nontrained E

15

Nontrained F

15

Participants began the testing session with the causal learning task consisting of
the two training phases and two test phases. Directions applicable to both training phases
were presented on the computer screen and read aloud by the experimenter (See
Appendix E). In each training phase food exemplar names appeared individually on the
computer screen as written words in size 48 Times New Roman uppercase font. For each
exemplar the participant made a prediction that the food would result in sickness or
health when it was eaten by Mr. X. The participant indicated this response by pressing
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the computer key marked “Sick” (Mr. X will get sick) or “Healthy” (Mr. X will remain
healthy). Each response was followed by feedback regardless of the accuracy of response.
“Sick”, written in red ink, followed a response to exemplars from the paired categories
(A+, C+, E+). “Healthy”, written in green ink, followed a response to exemplars from the
nonpaired categories (B-, D-, F-). In Training Phase 1, participants made predictions for
exemplars from the paired categories A+ and C+ resulting in sickness and the nonpaired
categories B- and D- resulting in health. Training Phase 2 continued in exactly the same
manner immediately following Training Phase 1. Foods in category A+ were again paired
with the sickness and those in category B- were nonpaired. Foods from categories C+ and
D- were replaced in this trial with foods from categories E+ (new “Sick” paired category)
and F- (new “Healthy” nonpaired category).
Following the training phases there was a five-minute distraction task during
which the participants were asked to name countries from different regions of the world
(Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008). The subsequent test phases included causal judgment
ratings and a test of exemplar recognition. Instructions for the causal judgment test
appeared on the computer screen and were read aloud by the experimenter. Five old
exemplars (seen in training) from each of the six categories as well as five new
(previously unseen) exemplars from these categories were randomly presented to the
participant for causal judgment. Because 10 exemplars from categories A+ and B- had
been presented over the two training phases, five were randomly selected from these 10
exemplars for causal judgment test. Five new exemplars from these categories were also
presented for causal judgment. The five exemplars from categories C+, D-, E+, and Fpresented during training were presented again along with five new exemplars from each
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of those categories. Thus, a total of 60 exemplars (five old and five new from each
category) were presented in the causal judgment test. The food names appeared randomly
one-at-a-time in the same manner as in the training phases. Participants decided, based on
the two training phases, how likely each presented exemplar was to cause sickness in Mr.
X. They assigned a numerical value between zero (Mr. X definitely will NOT get sick)
and 100 (Mr. X definitely WILL get sick) to express the percentage likelihood of the food
causing sickness in Mr. X and typed in the value using the computer keyboard. There was
no feedback during this phase of the task.
In the exemplar recognition phase of the experiment, participants were randomly
presented with all 120 exemplars (20 from each of the six food categories) and asked to
decide whether or not Mr. X ate the foods during the two training phases in the first part
of the experiment. Ten of the 20 examples from categories A and B and five of the 20
examples from categories C, D, E, and F had been eaten by Mr. X during the training
phases. Participants indicated their answer by typing in a number between zero (Mr. X
definitely did NOT eat this food) and 100 (Mr. X definitely ATE this food)
corresponding to their assessment of whether or not Mr. X ate the food. There was no
feedback during this phase.
Following the experimental task all participants completed a series of tests
assessing cognitive abilities. These tests, the cognitive abilities they measure, the criteria
for scoring, and the order in which they were administered are listed in Table 2. Results
from these individual difference measures for the two groups are presented in Table 3.
Participants were debriefed at the conclusion of the session.
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Table 2
Assessments of Individual Difference Abilities in Younger and Older Adults
Assessment

Measure of Cognitive Ability

Measures

Pattern Comparison

Processing Speed

Total score of correct
associations

Paired Associates

Learning and Memory

Total score of correct
associations

Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test

Working Memory and
Executive Function

Total number of correct
responses, errors,
perseverative responses,
perseverative errors, nonperseverative errors,
conceptual level responses

WAIS Digit Symbol

Processing Speed

Total score of correct
responses

WAIS Digit Symbol
Incidental Learning

Learning and Memory

Total score of correct
responses

FAS-Controlled Oral
Word Association

Working Memory and
Executive Function

Number of words

Mill Hill Vocabulary

Crystallized Verbal
Knowledge

Total score of correct
responses

Conditional Associative
Learning

Memory

Total score of successful
responses, retained
responses, forgotten
responses, discrimination
failures, perseverations
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Table 3
Comparisons of Age Differences in Individual Difference Measures
Measure

F

df

Younger
M
87.46

Younger
SD
17.04

Older
M
56.83

Older
SD
13.28

48.24 46

23.88

3.77

19.00

6.05

11.23 46

62.46

9.75

43.54

7.58

56.31 46

Reading Span

3.38

1.84

2.67

1.40

2.25 46

CAL – Forgotten*

1.33

1.90

3.88

2.71

14.15 46

.63

.97

2.75

2.57

14.32 46

.29

.75

2.58

2.57

17.59 46

32.13

5.03

39.63

6.93

18.39 46

3.92

1.32

3.13

1.39

4.10 46

105.67

9.96

87.63

17.72

18.89 46

Digit Symbol*
Digit Symbol
Incidental Learning*
Pattern Comparison*

CL – Discrimination
Failure*
CAL – Perseveration*
Mill Hill*
WCST – Categories
Completed*
Paired Associate
Learning*
!
Note: *p ! .05
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CHAPTER 3
Results
Responses for the last three trials for each category (A+, B-, C+, D-, E+, F-) in the
two training phases were assessed. Each of these 24 exemplar judgments was scored as
correct or incorrect. Participants were excluded from the study if they did not, on average
(more than 50%), predict sickness for categories A+, C+, and E+ and health for
categories B-, D-, and F- (Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008). All 24 young participants achieved
this proficiency level. Two of the 24 older adults failed to reach this level and two new
participants who met this criterion replaced them.
All analyses for data collected in this experiment were conducted using an alpha
level of p ! .05 as the criterion of significance.
Training
Young and older participants’ mean predictions for the five blocks in Training
Phases 1 and 2 are presented in Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5. As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3,
young and older participants’ Phase 1 predictions were initially very similar for all
categories. Moreover, across the five blocks, participants in both groups learned to
predict sickness when presented with exemplars from the categories paired with sickness
(A+ and C+) and to predict health when presented with exemplars from the nonpaired
categories (B- and D-). For both groups, the divergence in ratings between the paired and
nonpaired exemplars began on the second block in Phase 1.
Young and older participants’ mean predictions from Phase 2 are shown in
Figures 4 and 5, respectively. Participants in both groups showed divergent ratings
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for the pretrained categories A and B from the first block. As in Training Phase 1,
divergence for the untrained categories E and F began in the second trial and continued
for subsequent trials for both groups.

!
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Figure 3. Older adults’ mean Training Phase 1 predictions.
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!

!
Figure 4. Young adults’ mean Training Phase 2 predictions.
!!!

!
Figure 5. Older adults’ mean Training Phase 2 predictions.
!

29

Causal Judgment
!
In the causal judgment task, participants rated the likelihood that the food would
cause sickness. Young and older participants’ mean causal ratings for the new and old
exemplars from categories trained in Phase 1 and Phase 2 are presented in Figures 6 and
7, respectively. The ratings for Phase 1 were examined using a 2 (age group) X 2
(outcome) X 2 (category repetition) X 2 (exemplar status) mixed factorial ANOVA. The
results of this analysis are shown in Table 5. As can be seen, there were no main or
interaction effects of age in any of the tests of causal ratings, indicating that older adults’
causal learning performance was similar to that of young adults. However, there were
significant effects of outcome, status, the interaction of outcome and status, and the threeway interaction of repetition by outcome by status on these ratings. Overall, participants
rated the paired categories (A and C) more highly than the unpaired categories (B and D),
F(1, 46) = 406.34, MSE = 1286.91, p ! .001. The main effect of status of the exemplars
was significant, F(1, 46) = 3.88, MSE = 150.63, p = .05, but this variable also interacted
with outcome, F(1,46) = 23.29, MSE = 175.62, p = .000, suggesting that the difference
in causal ratings between paired (A and C) and nonpaired (B and D) categories was larger
for the old exemplars than for new exemplars.
All of these effects were qualified by the significant three-way interaction of
repetition, outcome, and status, F(1, 46) = 8.98, MSE = 152.93, p = .004. This interaction
was examined by analyzing the simple interaction of repetition and status at each level of
outcome. Repetition did not influence causal ratings if the category was paired with
sickness (A and C), but if the category was nonpaired (B and D), repetition made a
difference. For the paired categories (A and C) causal ratings were higher for the trained
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(old) than the new exemplars regardless of the number of times the category was repeated
[Repetition, F(1. 47) ! .001 MSE = 711.42, p = .999; Status, F(1, 47) = 21.75, MSE =
178.55, p ! .001; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = .65, MSE = 201.34, p = .425]. For the
nonpaired categories, the number of times the category was repeated in training affected
the causal ratings [Repetition, F(1. 47) = 4.03 MSE = 398.43, p = .051; Status, F(1, 47) =
5.62, MSE = 140.88, p = .022; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = 13.03, MSE = 128.91, p =
.001]. Causal judgment ratings were similar for old and new exemplars from the repeated
category (B), but for the nonrepeated category (D), old exemplars were given lower
causal ratings than novel exemplars, F(1, 47) = 13.03, MSE = 128.91, p = .001.
Table 5 shows causal rating ANOVA results for the Training Phase 2 categories.
As in Phase 1, there were no age group differences. The main effect of outcome was
significant, F(1, 46) = 722.23, MSE = 802.31, p ! .001, showing that again in Phase 2 the
participants rated the paired categories (A and E) more highly than the nonpaired
categories (B and F). The main effect of status was also significant in Phase 2, F(1, 46) =
58.15, MSE = 204.23, p = .006, showing that old exemplars seen in training were rated as
more causal than new exemplars. As in Phase 1, there was a significant interaction of
outcome and status, F(1, 46) = 24.40, MSE = 127.95, p ! .001, suggesting that the
difference in the causal ratings between paired (A and E) and nonpaired (B and F)
categories was larger for the old exemplars than for new exemplars. There was also a
three way interaction of repetition, outcome, and status, F(1, 46) = 5.84, MSE = 143.64,
p = .020 in this training phase.
The three-way interaction was again investigated by comparing the interaction of
repetition and status at each level of outcome. This analysis showed that for the paired
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outcome categories (A and E), only the old or new status of the exemplar was significant,
[Repetition, F(1. 47) = .03 MSE = 684.45, p = .876; Status, F(1, 47) = 22.90, MSE =
204.08, p ! .001; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = .1.43, MSE = 213.58, p = .238]. For
these categories causal judgment was higher for the old than the new exemplars
regardless of the number of times the category was repeated. When the category was
nonpaired, the number of times the category was presented made a difference in the
causal judgment, [Repetition, F(1. 47) = 1.84 MSE = 175.54, p = .182; Status, F(1, 47) =
.92, MSE = 123.27, p = .342; Repetition X Status, F(1, 47) = 10.60, MSE = 52.10, p =
.002]. For the nonpaired categories, causal judgment was similar for trained and novel
exemplars from the repeated category (B). For the nonrepeated category (F), the old,
trained exemplars were given lower causal ratings than novel exemplars, F(1, 47) =
10.60, MSE = 52.10, p = .002.
In summary, both young and older adults appropriately judged causal value for
category exemplars whether they were old or new. However there were differences in the
degree of generalization. For both groups, somewhat more generalization occurred for
exemplars from the nonpaired repeated category (B-) than for the paired repeated
category (A+) or for the non-repeated categories (C+, D-, E+, or F-) regardless of pairing.
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Figure 6. Young and older adults’ mean causal judgment ratings for Phase 1
paired (outcome) vs. nonpaired (no outcome) categories. Darker bars represent
exemplars shown in training. Lighter bars represent novel category exemplars.
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Exemplar Recognition
!
Hit and false alarm rates for old and new exemplars in each category in Phase 1
and Phase 2 were obtained for each participant and were used to calculate d’ scores. The
mean hit and false alarm rates for the old and new exemplars in each category are shown
in Table 6, d’ means for exemplar recognition are shown in Table 7, and mean d’ scores
are shown in Figure 8. A high d’ is an unbiased measure of recognition reflecting correct
recognition of old exemplars seen in training and correct rejection of novel exemplars not
seen in training.
D-prime scores for repeated (A, B) and non-repeated (C, D, E, and F) exemplars
seen in Phase 1 and 2 were examined using a 2 (age group) X 2 (phase) X 2 (repetition)
X 2 (outcome) mixed factorial ANOVA. The results of this analysis are shown in Table
8. There was an overall effect of age on exemplar recognition, F(1, 46) = 5.96, MSE =
6.41, p = .019, showing that younger adults discriminated old exemplars form new
significantly better than older adults. Recognition scores for the repeated categories (A
and B) were significantly lower than scores for the non-repeated categories (C, D, E, and
F) resulting in a main effect of repetition, F(1, 46) = 25.22, MSE = 1.77, p ! .001. In
addition, there was a significant interaction of repetition and age group, F(1, 46) = 97.62,
MSE = 1.77, p = .008. Analysis of the simple effect of repetition within each group
showed no group effect for the repeated categories (A and B), F(1, 46) = .75, MSE =
2.10, p = .391. However, for the nonrepeated categories (C and D, E and F) older adults
recognized significantly fewer exemplars than young adults, F(1, 46) = 12.16, MSE =
2.00, p = .001.

34

Overall, for the repeated categories (A and B), both young and older adults
showed low veridical exemplar recognition. Older adults showed similarly low
recognition for exemplars from the nonrepeated categories (C, D, E, and F), whereas
young adults showed increased memory for these categories.
4
Young

Recognition (d')

3.5
Older

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
R+

R-

NR +

NR -

Repetition x Outcome
Figure 8. Young and older participants’ d’ scores for repeated (R) categories A+
and B- and non-repeated categories (NR) categories C+, D-, E+, and F-. “+”
categories paired with sickness outcome and “-“ categories nonpaired.
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Table 4
ANOVA Results for Training Phase 1 (A, B, C, and D) Causal Judgment Measures
Effect

df

MS

F

p

h2

Repetition

1

803.88

1.41 .24

.03

Repetition X Group

1

481.51

.84 .36

.02

46

571.96

Outcome

1

522917.28

406.34 .00

.90

Outcome X Group

1

1626.90

1.26 .26

.03

46

1286.91

Status

1

584.11

3.88

05

.80

Status X Group

1

3.38

.02 .88

.00

46

150.63

Repetition X Outcome

1

800.42

1.45 .23

.03

Repetition X Outcome X Group

1

51.62

.09 .76

.00

46

550.43

Repetition X Status

1

436.91

2.46 .12

.05

Repetition X Status X Group

1

182.60

1.03 .31

.02

46

177.69

Outcome X Status

1

4089.87

23.29 .00

.34

Outcome X Status X Group

1

2.34

.01 .90

.00

46

175.62

1

1372.59

8.98 .00

.16

Error (Repetition)

Error (Outcome)

Error (Status)

Error (Repetition X Outcome)

Error (Repetition X Status)

Error (Outcome X Status)
Repetition X Outcome X Status

36

Repetition X Outcome X Status X Group
Error (Repetition X Outcome X Status)

1

130.20

46

152.93

Note: h2 denotes partial eta-squared.
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.85 .36

.02

Table 5
ANOVA Results for Training Phase 2 (A, B, E, and F) Causal Judgment Measures
Effect

df

MS

F

p

h2

Repetition

1

243.21

.52

.47

.01

Repetition X Group

1

303.88

.65

.36

.01

46

464.28

Outcome

1

579455.53

722.23

.00

.94

Outcome X Group

1

1740.81

2.17

.15

.05

46

802.31

Status

1

1665.00

8.15

.01

.15

Status X Group

1

78.84

.39

.54

.01

46

204.23

Repetition X Outcome

1

96.00

.24

.63

.00

Repetition X Outcome X Group

1

33.61

.08

.78

.00

46

407.07

Repetition X Status

1

18.20

.14

.71

.00

Repetition X Status X Group

1

7.82

.06

.81

.00

46

126.32

Outcome X Status

1

3121.32

23.39

.00

.35

Outcome X Status X Group

1

26.25

.20

.65

.00

46

127.95

1

838.98

5.84

.02

.11

Error (Repetition)

Error (Outcome)

Error (Status)

Error (Repetition X Outcome)

Error (Repetition X Status)

Error (Outcome X Status)
Repetition X Outcome X Status

38

Repetition X Outcome X Status X Group

1

61.12

Error (Repetition X Outcome X Status)

46

143.63

Note: h2 denotes partial eta-squared.

39

.43

.52

.01

Table 6
Mean Hit and False Alarm (FA) Rates for Exemplar Recognition
Category
A

Young
Hits
.74

Young
FA
.30

Older
Hits
.71

Older
FA
.41

B

.78

.32

.70

.35

C

.86

.17

.72

.29

D

.86

.20

.71

.27

E

.84

.18

.75

.26

F

.79

.17

.72

.24
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Table 7
Participant d’ Means for Exemplar Recognition
A
Phas. 1
2.15

A
Phas. 2
1.41

B
Phas. 1
2.16

B
Phas. 2
1.53

Older

1.48

1.29

2.00

Overall

1.82

1.35

2.06

Young
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C

D

E

F

2.91

3.16

2.86

2.55

1.50

1.62

1.74

2.08

2.01

1.51

2.27

2.45

2.47

2.28

Table 8
Omnibus ANOVA Results for d’ Exemplar Recognition Measures
Effect

df

MS

F

p

h2

Phase

1

5.81

3.17

.08

.06

Phase X Group

1

6.71

3.66

.06

.07

46

1.83

Repetition

1

44.72

25.22

.00

.35

Repetition X Group

1

13.52

7.63

.01

.14

46

1.77

Outcome

1

.99

.40

.53

.01

Outcome X Group

1

.68

.28

.60

.01

46

2.48

Phase X Repetition

1

6.55

3.60

.06

.07

Phase X Repetition X Group

1

.69

.38

.54

.01

46

1.82

Phase X Outcome

1

1.22

.57

.46

.01

Phase X Outcome X Group

1

.00

.00

.99

.00

46

2.16

Repetition X Outcome

1

1.01

.51

.48

.01

Repetition X Outcome X Group

1

.32

.16

.69

.00
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1.99

1

.86

.44

.51

.01
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1.96

Error (Phase)

Error (Repetition)

Error (Outcome)

Error (Phase X Repetition)

Error (Phase X Outcome)

Error (Repetition X Outcome)
Phase X Repetition X Outcome X Group
Error (Phase X Repetition X Outcome)
Note: h2 denotes partial eta-squared.
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CHAPTER 4
Discussion
In this study we used a food categorization task to investigate age-related stimulus
equivalence generalization differences in causal learning and recognition. In two training
phases, participants were presented with exemplars from six food categories.
Specifically, two categories were presented in both training phases providing a repeated
category, two categories were presented only in the first training phase providing an early
exposure category, and the two remaining categories were presented only in the second
training phase providing a late exposure category. Exemplars from half of the categories
in each training phase were consistently paired with the outcome of sickness in a fictional
patient. Exemplars from the other half of the categories were consistently nonpaired with
sickness and resulted in health for the patient. For each exemplar, participants predicted
the outcome and then received feedback as to whether or not it caused sickness.
Although young and older participants were never presented with the food category label,
they discriminated paired category exemplars from nonpaired category exemplars from
the second presentation forward. For the categories that were repeated in both training
phases, clear discrimination was present from the onset of Phase 2. In a subsequent test of
causal judgment, both young and older adults successfully judged the causal value of
both trained and new (nontrained) exemplars from the paired and nonpaired categories. A
later recognition test for exemplars that had been presented in training showed
differences between the groups. Although young and older adults showed low veridical
exemplar recognition for repeated categories presented in both training phases, young
adults recognized significantly more exemplars than older adults for the nonrepeated
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categories that were seen in only one training phase. Older adults were able to
successfully judge causal value without the veridical recognition memory for trained
exemplars regardless of whether the category was repeated or single presentation. Young
adults, on the other hand, were no different from the older adults for causal judgment or
recognition from the repeated categories, but they were able to recognize exemplars from
the single presentation categories. These findings provide evidence for separate cognitive
abilities.
Before turning to the theoretical implications, it is important to note that the
findings from the current study both replicate and extend Griffiths and Mitchell’s (2008)
results. Our younger and older adults, like Griffiths and Mitchell’s young adults
generated the absent cue category from trained exemplars and discriminated categories
that caused sickness from those that did not. They clearly demonstrated the ability to use
category membership to generalize causal value to new category exemplars, rating
categories paired with sickness as more causal than nonpaired categories. When category
exemplars were presented for causal judgment, both of our groups like Griffiths and
Mitchell’s participants recorded a larger difference in causal ratings between the paired
and nonpaired category exemplars that were actually seen in training than between the
corresponding new category exemplars.
In addition, we observed some findings that Griffiths and Mitchell (2008) did not
report. We found a difference in causal ratings between the trained and new nonpaired
category exemplars that did not exist for paired category exemplars. There was no
difference in the ratings for trained and new exemplars from paired categories regardless
of the number of times the category was repeated in training. For the categories that were
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not paired with sickness, the number of times a category was repeated in training made a
difference in the causal ratings. When the participants had experienced nonpaired food
categories twice in training, they judged new exemplars from those categories to have
low causal value. When the participants had experienced a nonpaired food category only
once in training, they were less certain of the low causal value of the exemplars.
Our young adults’ exemplar recognition data also replicated Griffiths and
Mitchell’s (2008) results. Both young groups showed no difference in recognition for the
paired and nonpaired categories that were repeated in the two training phases. Like
Griffiths and Mitchell’s, our young adults’ recognition scores for the repeated categories
were significantly lower than recognition scores for the nonrepeated categories. Our older
adults’ recognition for the repeated categories was equal to our young adults’. However
older adults’ recognition for exemplars from the nonrepeated categories was significantly
lower than that of the young adults.
Older adults are able to successfully use similarity to generate and mentally
represent the absent food category from the presented exemplars and then use category
membership to discriminate paired category exemplars from nonpaired category
exemplars. The findings from both the prediction discrimination training phase and the
causal judgment ratings at test are two sources of evidence that older adults, like young
adults, are able to generate an absent category label from presented exemplars and use the
generated category label and similarity to generalize causal value to new category
members. This finding stands in contrast to previous studies showing that older adults
exhibit deficits in causal learning tasks that require generation of absent cues. That
research has shown that older adults have difficulty using contingency and contiguity to
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make successful causal judgments when the cause of an outcome is the absence of a cue
(e.g., Mutter et al., 2006; Mutter et al., 2009; Mutter & Plumlee, 2009; Mutter &
Williams, 2004). Additional evidence of older adults’ decreased ability to use absent cues
in causal judgment is provided by the observed deficit in their ability to retrospectively
revalue the causal value of absent cues when the paradigm requires associative rather
than categorical representations. Mutter et al. (in press) found that older adults had
difficulty in revaluing absent cues when the associative link between cue pairs was either
formed during training or was already present due to prior experience (e.g. “steak – cake”
vs. “steak – potato”). In the current study, older adults were clearly able to use categorical
knowledge to generate the absent cue category and use it to revalue the causal cue
efficacy of novel cues as successfully as younger adults.
Both young and older adults showed poor exemplar recognition for the repeated
categories. This result was expected based on similar findings from prior studies showing
reduced recognition from categories with which participants have the most experience
(Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008; Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997; Seamon, Luo, Schlegel, Greene,
& Goldenberg, 2000; Schacter & Slotnick, 2004; Verfaellie et al., 2004). In contrast, we
found age differences for the nonrepeated categories. Young adults seem to show two
distinct abilities: the ability to generalize causal value to absent cue category exemplars
and to veridically remember specific exemplars – as long as exposure to the category is
limited as in the nonrepeated categories. Older adults show the same generalization
ability, but do not show improved exemplar recognition for nonrepeated-category
exemplars. Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) suggested that the pronounced tendency of
older adults to falsely recognize category exemplars from categories from which they had
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extensive experience was evidence that they relied on general similarities – gist – rather
than exact exemplar attributes. In this experiment it was possible to use gist to make
successful causal judgments about an exemplar without remembering exact details about
that exemplar. However, this was not the case in the recognition test. These findings
provide evidence of two distinct cognitive processes: knowing and successfully using
information is distinct from remembering details about that information (Tulving, 1985).
Fuzzy-Trace Theory (FTT), a dual-process theory of cognition and memory
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd, Reyna, & Howe, 2009) provides a framework for
understanding the present findings for causal judgment and exemplar recognition
memory. FTT posits that experiences are processed on a continuum of exactness from
detailed verbatim to gist. Verbatim, in this context, is a literal representation that captures
precise surface information whether that information is verbal, numeric, graphic, or any
other form (Reyna, 2008). Gist represents a kind of intuition, fuzzy traces, which extract
and preserve only essential meaning or patterns from experiences. These verbatim and
fuzzy traces can enter memory as parallel mental representations of the same event. This
ability for parallel processing allows for cognitive options and flexibility (Brainerd &
Reyna, 1990). Much evidence supporting FTT has been found using a DRM procedure
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Tun et al., 1998). In
this paradigm, gist processing is measured by the false memory of related lures and
verbatim processing is measured by correct recall or recognition of presented cues.
Exactly how experiences are processed, encoded, and retrieved is affected by the
amount of experience, the context, the individual’s knowledge and developmental stage
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). Verbatim processing provides the basis for rote learning that
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is called for under certain circumstances in real life and in most laboratory memory tasks.
Gist provides the basis for comprehension, concept learning, rational thinking, decisionmaking, and, as the results from our study show, causal judgment (Brainerd et al., 2009).
Even though encoding of verbatim and gist traces may take place in parallel, there is a
dissociation of verbatim and gist traces during retrieval. Gist traces survive longer than
verbatim traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004). If tested immediately, verbatim information is
available. If tested after a delay, responses reflect more and more gist retrieval (Brainerd
& Reyna, 2001; Seamon et al., 2000). In general, people rely on gist processing when
possible; gist traces provide more relevant information than verbatim traces, are more
cognitively available, more malleable, and easier to access (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990).
FTT proposes a detailed description of developmental changes. People at all ages
are capable of both verbatim and gist processing, but consistent findings have shown
developmental differences in the verbatim/gist ratio. Young children have very low levels
of false memory implying little gist processing. They appear to literally not “get the gist”
of related word lists. Throughout childhood and the early adolescent years direct access
to verbatim traces and reconstruction of gist traces increases, resulting in increased rote
memory and increased comprehension. Judgment that information is familiar does not
appear to increase significantly during this period (Brainerd et al., 2009). Young
adolescents show increased false memory but still demonstrate a level below that of
young adults (Brainerd et al., 2002). Between young adolescence and young adulthood,
there appears to be a large increase in the ability to judge familiarity and a small increase
in direct access, without corresponding change in the reconstruction of gist traces
(Brainerd et al., 2009). Late adulthood brings a marked decline in direct access to
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veridical verbatim recollection, a lesser decline in reconstruction, and a stabilization of
familiarity. The cognitive changes associated with late adulthood are a result of the
decline in direct access to verbatim traces which results in a net increase of reliance on
familiarity (Brainerd et al., 2009).
Output interference is also an assumption of FTT (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990).
Repeated experience with and responding to stimuli produces noise in the storage and
retrieval of information that has detrimental effects on memory and results in output
interference. The more experience a person has with encoding/retrieving information, the
more a person relies on gist memory (Holiday, Brainerd, & Reyna, 2011; Mutter, 2000:
Schacter & Slotnick, 2004). Apparently they connect the gist of experience through
repeated exposure. Repeated testing and recall, as well as longer study lists, force the use
of reconstruction over direct recall, which activates gist traces over verbatim traces
(Brainerd et al., 2009). There are also developmental differences in output interference.
Young children and older adults suffer more from output interference than do young
adults. This discrepancy contributes to a reduction in older adults’ ability to produce
verbatim responses (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990).
Fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd et al., 2009) provides a
theoretical foundation for the causal learning and recognition findings from this study. As
exemplars were presented in training, participants encoded parallel verbatim
representations for the exemplars and outcomes as well as gist-based category
representations for the exemplars. They then used the gist-based category representations
to generalize causal value to new category exemplars. Both young and older participants
discriminated the paired categories from the nonpaired categories and successfully
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generalized causal value to new category members based on these gist-based
representations. Exemplar recognition results also follow FTT predictions. Exemplar
recognition for repeated categories was poor for both young and older adults. Output
interference predicts that verbatim information about exemplars from categories with
which participants have had extensive experience will be unavailable. Young adults
showed significantly better ability to use verbatim memory to distinguish nonrepeatedcategory trained exemplars from new ones and also generalized causal value to these
exemplars. This finding suggests that young adults were able to use gist and verbatim
processing in a relatively flexible manner. They used gist information when the causal
judgment task demanded it, but retained the ability to use verbatim information for
memory. Older adults, on the other hand, showed less flexibility. They were able to use
gist information to successfully generalize causal value but they were not able to use
verbatim information to successfully distinguish between old and new exemplars.
However, as FTT predicts, although older adults showed low verbatim processing for the
categories that were only experienced once in training, they did show a small recency
boost in memory for exemplars that were seen only in the last training phase. This
finding that older adults can use gist to make successful causal judgments extends
Mutter’s (2000) findings that older adults use gist to make successful judgments
regarding majority vs. minority group impressions in an illusory correlation paradigm
even though they had poor verbatim memory for specific group-trait information.
One important implication from these findings may aid in the understanding of
how older adults make causal judgments in daily life. Although the idea of a causal
learning task that uses similarity to judge whether or not a food might cause illness may
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seem rather removed from real life, in a study that mirrors these laboratory results,
Carvalho, Block, Sivaramakrishnan, Manchanda, & Mitakakis (2008) found that people
in real life used cultural similarity to assess perception of their risk to food-borne illness.
Many older adults need to successfully judge causal value for risks associated with illness
or medical treatment. FTT, coupled with our findings that older adults may often use gistbased processing in causal judgment without being able to remember detailed, verbatim
causal cues, provides evidence that the way information is presented may make a
difference in decisions as basic as informed consent, drug therapies, or surgery (Reyna,
2008).
In summary, the current study provides evidence that older adults are able to use
similarity as a cue to causality even though they have reduced verbatim memory for these
cues. FTT proposes that gist processing is actually preferable to verbatim processing and
leads to successful, rational judgments that take experience, context, and emotion into
consideration. This global way of processing information may be the quality that is
traditionally referred to as wisdom.
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Appendix A

Category exemplars arranged by production rank typicality.
Alcoholic Beverage

Fruit

Meat

BEER

CHICKEN

BEEF

WINE

ORANGE

BEEF

VODKA

BANANA

PORK

LIQUOR

PEAR

STEAK

RUM

GRAPE

BACON

WHISKEY

PEACH

HAM

MARTINI

STRAWBERRY

HAMBURGER

MARGUERITA

PINEAPPLE

TURKEY

LJACK DANIELS

PLUM

LAMB

TEQUILA

MANGO

SAUSAGE

GIN

KIWI

DEER

CHAMPAGNE

WATERMELON

HOT DOG

DAIQUIRI

GRAPEFRUIT

BOLOGNA

SCOTCH

LEMIN

DUCK

BOURBON

CANTALOUPE

MUTTON

COGNAC

TANGERINE

GOAT

BLOODY MARY

RASPBERRY

PHEASANT

MOONSHINE

BLUEBERRY

LIVER

BRANDY

LIME

RIBS

COCKTAIL

BLACKBERRY

QUAIL
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Non-alcoholic Beverage

Seafood

Vegetable

COKE

TROUT

CARROT

SODA

SALMON

TOMATO

PEPSI

FLOUNDER

BROCCOLI

WATER

BASS

CELERY

JUICE

CATFISH

POTATO

SPRITE

TUNA

LETTUCE

MILK

PERCH

CORN

ORANGE JUICE

SWORDFISH

PEAS

KOOL-AID

HALIBUT

GREEN BEANS

LEMONADE

SHRIMP

CUCUMBER

APPLE JUICE

LOBSTER

ASPARAGUS

TEA

CRAB

PEPPERS

DR. PEPPER

SHARK

ONION

FRUIT PUNCH

CLAMS

SPINACH

CRANBERRY JUICE

MUSSELS

SQUASH

COFFEE

SQUID

CABBAGE

GATORADE

CALAMARI

CAULIFLOWER

GRAPE JUICE

SCALLOPS

TURNIP

HOT CHOCOLATE

OYSTERS

BEETS

GINGER ALE

SNAPPER

RADISH
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Appendix B
Category exemplar set lists
Alcoholic Beverage Sets (Typicality Number)
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

BEER (1)

WINE (2)

VODKA (3)

LIQUOR (4)

MARGUERITA (8)

RUM (5)

WHISKEY (6)

MARTINI (7)

GIN (11)

CHAMPAGNE (12)

JACK DANIELS (9)

TEQUILA (10)

SCOTCH (14)

BOURBON (15)

COGNAC (16)

DAIQUIRI (13)

BLOODY MARY (17)

MOONSHINE (18)

BRANDY (19)

COCKTAIL (20)

Fruit Sets (Typicality Number)
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

APPLE (1)

ORANGE (2)

BANANA (3)

PEAR (4)

PINEAPPLE (8)

GRAPE (5)

PEACH (6)

STRAWBERRY (7)

KIWI (11)

WATERMELON (12)

PLUM (9)

MANGO (10)

LEMON (14)

CANTALOUPE (15)

TANGERINE (16)

GRAPEFRUIT (13)

RASPBERRY (17)

BLUEBERRY (18)

LIME (19)

BLACKBERRY (20)
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Meat Sets (Typicality Number)
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

CHICKEN (1)

BEEF (2)

PORK (3)

STEAK (4)

TURKEY (8)

BACON (5)

HAM (6)

HAMBURGER (7)

DEER (11)

HOT DOG (12)

LAMB (9)

SAUSAGE (10)

DUCK (14)

MUTTON (15)

GOAT (16)

BOLOGNA (13)

PHEASANT (17)

LIVER (18)

RIBS (19)

QUAIL (20)

Non-alcoholic Beverage Sets (Typicality Number)
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

COKE (1)

SODA (2)

PEPSI (3)

WATER (4)

ORANGE JUICE(8)

JUICE (5)

SPRITE (6)

MILK (7)

APPLE JUICE (11)

TEA (12)

KOOL-AID (9)

LEMONADE (10)

FRUIT PUNCH(14)

CRANBERRY
JUICE (15)
GRAPE JUICE (18)

COFFEE (16)

DR. PEPPER (13)

HOT CHOC. (19)

GINGER ALE(20)

GATORADE (17)
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Seafood Sets (Typicality Number)
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

TROUT (1)

SALMON (2)

FLOUNDER (3)

BASS (4)

SWORDFISH (8)

CATFISH (5)

TUNA (6)

PERCH (7)

LOBSTER (11)

CRAB (12)

HALIBUT (9)

SHRIMP (10)

CLAMS (14)

MUSSELS (15)

SQUID (16)

SHARK (13)

CALAMARI (17)

SCALLOPS (18)

OYSTERS (19)

SNAPPER (20)

Vegetable Sets (Typicality Number)
Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

CARROT (1)

TOMATO (2)

BROCCOLI (3)

CELERY (4)

PEAS (8)

POTATO (5)

LETTUCE (6)

CORN (7)

ASPARAGUS (11)

PEPPERS (12)

CUCUMBER (10)

SPINACH (14)

SQUASH (15)

GREEN BEANS
(9)
CABBAGE (16)

CAULIFLOWER (17)

TURNIP (18)

BEETS (19)

RADISH (20)
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Set 4

ONION (13)

Appendix C
Schedule of sets
Training 1

Training 2

Causal Judgment Recognition

Order 1

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Order 2

Set 4

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Order 3

Set 3

Set 4

Set 1

Set 2

Order 4

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Set 1

Order 5

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3

Set 4

Order 6

Set 4

Set 1

Set 2

Set 3
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Appendix D
Schedule of category assignment to orders 1-6
Order

1

2

3

4

A+

Al Bev

Fruit

Meat

Non-al Bev Seafood

Vegetable

B-

Meat

Non-al Bev Seafood

Vegetable

Al Bev

Fruit

C+

Vegetable

Al Bev

Fruit

Meat

Non-al Bev Seafood

D-

Fruit

Meat

Non-al Bev Seafood

Vegetable

Al Bev

E+

Non-al Bev Seafood

Vegetable

Al Bev

Fruit

Meat

F-

Seafood

Al Bev

Fruit

Meat

Non-al Bev

Vegetable
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5

6

Orders of exemplar presentation
Order 1
A+ Alcoholic Beverage

D- Fruit

B- Meat

E+ Non-alcoholic Beverage

C+ Vegetable

F- Seafood

Training Phase 1
A+

B-

C+

D-

BEER

CHICKEN

CARROT

APPLE

MARGUERITA

TURKEY

PEAS

PINEAPPLE

GIN

DEER

ASPARAGUS

KIWI

SCOTCH

DUCK

SPINACH

LEMON

BLOODY MARY

PHEASANT

CAULIFLOWER

RASPBERRY

Training Phase 2
A+

B-

E+

F-

WINE

BEEF

SODA

SALMON

RUM

BACON

JUICE

CATFISH

CHAMPAGNE

HOT DOG

TEA

CRAB

BOURBON

MUTTON

MUSSELS

MOONSHINE

LIVER

CRANBERRY
JUICE
GRAPE JUICE

SCALLOPS

Causal Judgment Test
A+

B-

C+

MARGUERITA

TURKEY

CARROT
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SCOTCH

DUCK

PEAS

BLOODY MARY

PHEASANT

ASPARAGUS

CHAMPAGNE

HOT DOG

SPINACH

BOURBON

MUTTON

CAULIFLOWER

VODKA

PORK

BROCCOLI

WHISKEY

HAM

LETTUCE

JACK DANIELS

LAMB

GREEN BEANS

COGNAC

GOAT

CABBAGE

BRANDY

RIBS

BEETS

D-

E+

F-

APPLE

SODA

SALMON

PINEAPPLE

JUICE

CATFISH

KIWI

TEA

CRAB

LEMON

CRANBERRY JUICE

MUSSELS

RASPBERRY

GRAPE JUICE

SCALLOPS

BANANA

PEPSI

FLOUNDER

PEACH

SPRITE

TUNA

PLUM

KOOL-AID

HALIBUT

TANGERINE

COFFEE

SQUID

LIME

HOT CHOCOLATE

OYSTER
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Order 2
A+ Fruit

D- Meat

B- Non-alcoholic Beverage

E+ Seafood

C+ Alcoholic Beverage

F- Vegetable

Training Phase 1
A+

B-

C+

D-

PEAR

WATER

LIQUOR

STEAK

STRAWBERRY

MILK

MARTINI

HAMBURGER

MANGO

LEMONADE

TEQUILA

SAUSAGE

GRAPEFRUIT

DR. PEPPER

DAIQUIRI

BOLOGNA

BLACKBERRY

GINGER ALE

COCKTAIL

QUAIL

A+

B-

E+

F-

APPLE

COKE

TROUT

CARROT

PINEAPPLE

ORANGE JUICE

SWORDFISH

PEAS

KIWI

APPLE JUICE

LOBSTER

ASPARAGUS

LEMON

FRUIT PUNCH

CLAMS

SPINACH

RASPBERRY

GATORADE

CALAMARI

CAULIFLOWER

Training Phase 2

Causal Judgment Test
A+

B-

C+

STRAWBERRY

MILK

LIQUOR
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GRAPEFRUIT

DR. PEPPER

MARTINI

BLACKBERRY

GINGER ALE

TEQUILA

KIWI

APPLE JUICE

DAIQUIRI

LEMON

FRUIT PUNCH

COCKTAIL

ORANGE

SODA

WINE

GRAPE

JUICE

RUM

WATERMELON

TEA

CHAMPAGNE

CANTALOUPE

CRANBERRY JUICE

BOURBON

BLUEBERRY

GRAPE JUICE

MOONSHINE

D-

E+

F-

STEAK

TROUT

CARROT

HAMBURGER

SWORDFISH

PEAS

SAUSAGE

LOBSTER

ASPARAGUS

BOLOGNA

CLAMS

SPINACH

QUAIL

CALAMARI

CAULIFLOWER

BEEF

SALMON

TOMATO

BACON

CATFISH

POTATO

HOT DOG

CRAB

PEPPERS

MUTTON

MUSSELS

SQUASH

LIVER

SCALLOPS

TURNIP
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Order 3
A+ Meat

D- Non-alcoholic Beverage

B- Seafood

E+ Vegetable

C+ Fruit

F- Alcoholic Beverage

Training Phase 1
A+

B-

C+

D-

PORK

FLOUNDER

BANANA

PEPSI

HAM

TUNA

PEACH

SPRITE

LAMB

HALIBUT

PLUM

KOOL-AID

GOAT

SQUID

TANGERINE

COFFEE

RIBS

OYSTERS

LIME

HOT
CHOCOLATE

A+

B-

E+

F-

STEAK

BASS

CELERY

LIQUOR

HAMBURGER

PERCH

CORN

MARTINI

SAUSAGE

SHRIMP

CUCUMBER

TEQUILA

BOLOGNA

SHARK

ONION

DAIQUIRI

QUAIL

SNAPPER

RADISH

COCKTAIL

Training Phase 2

Causal Judgment Test
A+

B-

C+

HAM

TUNA

BANANA
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GOAT

SQUID

PEACH

RIBS

OYSTERS

PLUM

SAUSAGE

SHRIMP

TANGERINE

BOLOGNA

SHARK

LIME

CHICKEN

TROUT

APPLE

TURKEY

SWORDFISH

PINEAPPLE

DEER

LOBSTER

KIWI

DUCK

CLAMS

LEMON

PHEASANT

CALAMARI

RASPBERRY

D-

E+

F-

PEPSI

CELERY

LIQUOR

SPRITE

CORN

MARTINI

KOOL-AID

CUCUMBER

TEQUILA

COFFEE

ONION

DAIQUIRI

HOT CHOCOLATE

RADISH

COCKTAIL

COKE

CARROT

BEER

ORANGE JUICE

PEAS

MARGUERITA

APPLE JUICE

ASPARAGUS

GIN

FRUIT PUNCH

SPINACH

SCOTCH

GATORADE

CAULIFLOWER

BLOODY MARY
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Order 4
A+ Non-alcoholic Beverage D- Seafood
B- Vegetable

E+ Alcoholic Beverage

C+ Meat

F- Fruit

Training Phase 1
A+

B-

C+

D-

SODA

TOMATO

BEEF

SALMON

JUICE

POTATO

BACON

CATFISH

TEA

PEPPERS

HOT DOG

CRAB

CRANBERRY
JUICE
GRAPE JUICE

SQUASH

MUTTON

MUSSELS

TURNIP

LIVER

SCALLOPS

A+

B-

E+

F-

PEPSI

BROCCOLI

VODKA

BANANA

SPRITE

LETTUCE

WHISKEY

PEACH

KOOL-AID

GREEN BEANS

JACK DANIELS

PLUM

COFFEE

CABBAGE

COGNAC

TANGERINE

HOT
CHOCOLATE

BEETS

BRANDY

LIME

Training Phase 2

Causal Judgment Test
A+

B-

C-

JUICE

POTATO

BEEF

CRANBERRY JUICE

SQUASH

BACON
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GRAPE JUICE

TURNIP

HOT DOG

KOOL-AID

GREEN BEANS

MUTTON

COFFEE

CABBAGE

LIVER

WATER

CELERY

STEAK

MILK

CORN

HAMBURGER

LEMONADE

CUCUMBER

SAUSAGE

DR. PEPPER

ONION

BOLOGNA

GINGER ALE

RADISH

QUAIL

D-

E+

F-

SALMON

VODKA

BANANA

CATFISH

WHISKEY

PEACH

CRAB

JACK DANIELS

PLUM

MUSSELS

COGNAC

TANGERINE

SCALOPS

BRANDY

LIME

BASS

LIQUOR

PEAR

PERCH

MARTINI

STRAWBERRY

SHRIMP

TEQUILA

MANGO

SHARK

DAIQUIRI

GRAPEFRUIT

SNAPPER

COCKTAIL

BLACKBERRY
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Order 5
A+ Seafood

D- Vegetable

B- Alcoholic Beverage

E+ Fruit

C+ Non-alcoholic Beverage F- Meat
Training Phase 1
A+

B-

C+

D-

TROUT

BEER

COKE

CARROT

SWORDFISH

MARGUERITA

ORANGE JUICE

PEAS

LOBSTER

GIN

APPLE JUICE

ASPARAGUS

CLAMS

SCOTCH

FRUIT PUNCH

SPINACH

CALAMARI

BLOODY MARY

GATORADE

CAULIFLOWER

A+

B-

E+

F-

SALMON

WINE

ORANGE

BEEF

CATFISH

RUM

GRAPE

BACON

CRAB

CHAMPAGNE

WATERMELON

HOT DOG

MUSSELS

BOURBON

CANTALOUPE

MUTTON

SCALLOPS

MOONSHINE

BLUEBERRY

LIVER

Training Phase 2

Causal Judgment Test
A+

B-

C+

SWORDFISH

MARGUERITA

COKE
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CLAMS

SCOTCH

ORANGE JUICE

CALAMARI

BLOODY MARY

APPLE JUICE

CRAB

CHAMPAGNE

FRUIT PUNCH

MUSSELS

BOURBON

GATORADE

FLOUNDER

VODKA

PEPSI

TUNA

WHISKEY

SPRITE

HALIBUT

JACK DANIELS

KOOL-AID

SQUID

COGNAC

COFFEE

OYSTERS

BRANDY

HOT CHOCOLATE

D-

E+

F-

CARROT

ORANGE

BEEF

PEAS

GRAPE

BACON

ASPARAGUS

WATERMELON

HOT DOG

SPINACH

CANTALOUPE

MUTTON

CAULIFLOWER

BLUEBERRY

LIVER

BROCCOLI

BANANA

PORK

LETTUCE

PEACH

HAM

GREEN BEANS

PLUM

LAMB

CABBAGE

TANGERINE

GOAT

BEETS

LIME

RIBS
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Order 6
A+ Vegetable

D- Alcoholic Beverage

B- Fruit

E+ Meat

C+ Seafood

F- Non-alcoholic Beverage

Training Phase 1
A+

B-

C+

D-

CELERY

PEAR

BASS

LIQUOR

CORN

STRAWBERRY

PERCH

MARTINI

CUCUMBER

MANGO

SHRIMP

TEQUILA

ONION

GRAPEFRUIT

SHARK

DAIQUIRI

RADISH

BLACKBERRY

SNAPPER

COCKTAIL

A+

B-

E+

F-

CARROT

APPLE

CHICKEN

COKE

PEAS

PINEAPPLE

TURKEY

ORANGE JUICE

ASPARAGUS

KIWI

DEER

APPLE JUICE

SPINACH

LEMON

DUCK

FRUIT PUNCH

CAULIFLOWER

RASPBERRY

PHEASANT

GATORADE

Training Phase 2

Causal Judgment Test
A+

B-

C+

CORN

STRAWBERRY

BASS

ONION

GRAPEFRUIT

PERCH
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RADISH

BLACKBERRY

SHRIMP

ASPARAGUS

KIWI

SHARK

SPINACH

LEMON

SNAPPER

TOMATO

ORANGE

SALMON

POTATO

GRAPE

CATFISH

PEPPERS

WATERMELON

CRAB

SQUASH

CANTALOUPE

MUSSELS

TURNIP

BLUEBERRY

SCALLOPS

D-

E+

F-

LIQUOR

CHICKEN

COKE

MARTINI

TURKEY

ORANGE JUICE

TEQUILA

DEER

APPLE JUICE

DAIQUIRI

DUCK

FRUIT PUNCH

COCKTAIL

PHEASANT

GATORADE

WINE

BEEF

SODA

RUM

BACON

JUICE

CHAMPAGNE

HOT DOG

TEA

BOURBON

MUTTON

CRANBERRY JUICE

MOONSHINE

LIVER

GRAPE JUICE
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Appendix E
Participant instructions
Training Phase Instructions
In the following experiment you are to imagine that you are an allergist, someone
who tries to discover the cause of allergic reactions in people. You have just been
presented with a new patient, Mr. X, who suffers from allergic reactions following some
meals, but not others. In an attempt to discover which foods cause Mr. X to have allergic
reactions, you arrange for him to eat various foods for a meal on each day, and observe
whether he has an allergic reaction.

The computer will display to you the food he has for each meal. After each
presentation, please predict whether Mr. X will have an allergic reaction after this meal
or not. To do this, press the key marked “Y” to indicate that the food WILL make Mr. X
sick or press the key marked “N” to indicate that the food will NOT make Mr. X sick. The
computer will then tell you if an allergic reaction occurred.

Speed of response is not important, so take as much time as you need before
responding. Obviously, at first you will have to guess, as you don’t know anything abut
your patient, but hopefully as you continue to be presented with meals, you will begin to
learn which foods cause allergic reactions.
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Test Phase 1 – Causal Judgment Task Instructions
You will now be presented some foods. Mr. X may or may not have eaten these
foods earlier. You job is to assess whether these foods will make Mr. X sick. For each
food, please rate whether you think Mr. X will get sick or not. To do this, type in the
number between 0 and 100 (0 = Mr. X definitely will NOT get sick. 100 = Mr. X
definitely WILL get sick.) that corresponds to the likelihood of the food making Mr. X
sick.

Test Phase 2 – Exemplar Recognition Task Instructions
You will now be presented with a series of foods. Mr. X may or may not have
eaten these foods in the first part of the experiment. Your task is to state whether or not
you remember these foods from the very first part of the experiment. To do this, please
type in the number between 0 and 100 (0 = Mr. X definitely did NOT eat the food. 100 =
Mr. X definitely did EAT the food.) that corresponds to your memory for the food.

77

Appendix F
WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY
Human Subjects Review Board
Office of Sponsored Programs
301 Potter Hall
270-745-4652; Fax 270-745-4211
E-mail: Paul.Mooney@wku.edu
In future correspondence, please refer to HS10-038, September 21, 2009
Melanie W. Asriel
c/o Dr. Sharon Muter
Psychology
WKU
Melanie W. Asriel:
Your research project, Aging and Generalization of Causal Value, was reviewed by the HSRB and it has
been determined that risks to subjects are: (1) minimized and reasonable; and that (2) research procedures
are consistent with a sound research design and do not expose the subjects to unnecessary risk. Reviewers
determined that: (1) benefits to subjects are considered along with the importance of the topic and that
outcomes are reasonable; (2) selection of subjects is equitable; and (3) the purposes of the research and the
research setting is amenable to subjects’ welfare and producing desired outcomes; that indications of
coercion or prejudice are absent, and that participation is clearly voluntary.
1.

In addition, the IRB found that you need to orient participants as follows: (1) signed informed consent
is required; (2) Provision is made for collecting, using and storing data in a manner that protects the
safety and privacy of the subjects and the confidentiality of the data. (3) Appropriate safeguards are
included to protect the rights and welfare of the subjects.
This project is therefore approved at the Expedited Review Level until September 21, 2010.

2.

Please note that the institution is not responsible for any actions regarding this protocol before
approval. If you expand the project at a later date to use other instruments please re-apply. Copies of
your request for human subjects review, your application, and this approval, are maintained in the
Office of Sponsored Programs at the above address. Please report any changes to this approved
protocol to this office. A Continuing Review protocol will be sent to you in the future to determine the
status of the project. Also, please use the stamped approval forms to assure participants of compliance
with The Office of Human Research Protections regulations.

Sincerely,

Paul J. Mooney, M.S.T.M.
Compliance Coordinator
Office of Sponsored Programs
Western Kentucky University
cc: HS file number Asriel HS10-038
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Appendix G
INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT/STUDY
Project Title: Age Differences in Judgment and Decision Making
1. I, __________________________________________, agree to participate in a research project conducted by
scientists at Western Kentucky University. I understand that the project involves research and that the purpose of
the research is to study how the processes of learning and judgment vary across the life span.
2. I understand that the procedures to be followed are: I will first complete questionnaires concerning my
background (e.g., age, education, and income) and general health. I will then be administered several tasks designed
to assess my learning ability and perform related mental operations. I understand that these tasks will be simple and
well within my ability to complete. I will also be given tasks that measure cognitive abilities such as my vocabulary
and extent of my general knowledge. All of these tasks will be drawn from standard psychological test batteries and
from published psychological studies.
I understand that these tasks and questionnaires will be administered to me in the Cognition Laboratory at Western
Kentucky University.
3. I understand that I may decline to answer specific questions in any of the questionnaires administered in this
study if I so choose and that by completing these questionnaires I give my consent for use of these data by the
researchers.
4. I understand that the tasks and questionnaires that will be administered in this study are experimental in nature.
They may not be related to my ability to carry out normal daily activities or job-related duties.
5. I understand that my scores will be combined with those of other participants to obtain group scores and that
information on group performance will be available to me, if I so desire, in written reports of the results of this
research.
6. I understand that the information collected in this study will only be used in ways that will not reveal who I am.
Any personal information that could identify me will be removed or changed before files are shared with other
researchers or results are made public. I also understand that Federal or state laws may require the researchers to
show information to university or government officials [or sponsors], who are responsible for monitoring the safety
of this study.
7. I understand that the only foreseeable risks or discomforts to me as a result of participation in this study may be a
feeling of boredom during the procedure or a feeling of not doing well. I understand that there is nothing unusual
about these feelings and that I may discuss any perceptions and feelings that I have about the research with the
interviewer if I so desire.
8. I understand that the benefits to me or to others, which may be reasonably expected from the research, are: a
chance to contribute to the understanding of how important psychological processes change with age.
9. I understand that I will receive course credit or extra credit and if applicable, monetary compensation for my
participation. I further understand that the primary costs I will incur as a result of participating in this research are in
time spent with the interviewer -- approximately one to four hours are required to complete all tasks.
10. I understand that my participation in this research study is voluntary, that my refusal to participate will involve
no penalty or loss of benefits to which I might be otherwise be entitled and that I may discontinue my participation
at any time without penalty or loss of credits already obtained.
11. I understand that my current class standing and grade will not be affected by my decision to withdraw from this
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research study.
12. I understand that there are no anticipated circumstances under which my participation may be terminated by the
investigator without regard to my consent.
13. I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research but prior to my own
participation, and which may relate to my willingness to continue participation, will be provided to me prior to my
beginning the task.
14. I have had an opportunity to ask ____________________________ questions about the research project. I
understand that I may contact Dr. Sharon Mutter, Department of Psychology, (270) 745-4389 for additional
information about this research and for any questions I might have concerning the conduct of this study.
15. I have received a signed copy of this consent form.
Signature of Participant
Witness
Date and Time

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Paul Mooney, Human Protections Administrator
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652
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INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT/STUDY
Project Title: Age Differences in Judgment and Decision Making
1. I, _____________________________________, agree to participate in a research project conducted by scientists
at Western Kentucky University. I understand that the project involves research and that the purpose of the research
is to study how the processes of learning and judgment vary across the life span.
2. I understand that the procedures to be followed are: I will first complete questionnaires concerning my
background (e.g., age, education, and income) and general health. I will then be administered several tasks designed
to assess my learning ability and perform related mental operations. I understand that these tasks will be simple and
well within my ability to complete. I will also be given tasks that measure cognitive abilities such as my vocabulary
and the extent of my general knowledge. All of these tasks will be drawn from standard psychological test batteries
and from published psychological studies.
I understand that these tasks and questionnaires will be administered to me in the Cognition Laboratory at Western
Kentucky University.
3. I understand that I may decline to answer specific questions in any of the questionnaires administered in this
study if I so choose and that by completing these questionnaires I give my consent for use of these data by the
researchers.
4. I understand that the tasks and questionnaires that will be administered in this study are experimental in nature.
They are not related to my ability to carry out normal daily activities or job-related duties.
5. I understand that my scores will be combined with those of other participants to obtain group scores and that
information on group performance will be available to me, if I so desire, in written reports of the results of this
research.
6. I understand that the information collected in this study will only be used in ways that will not reveal who I am.
Any personal information that could identify me will be removed or changed before files are shared with other
researchers or results are made public. I also understand that Federal or state laws may require the researchers to
show information to university or government officials [or sponsors], who are responsible for monitoring the safety
of this study.
7. I understand that the only foreseeable risks or discomforts to me as a result of participation in this study may be a
feeling of boredom during the procedure or a feeling of not doing well. I understand that there is nothing unusual
about these feelings and that I may discuss any perceptions and feelings that I have about the research with the
interviewer if I so desire.
8. I understand that the benefits to me or to others, which may be reasonably expected from the research, are: a
chance to contribute to the understanding of how important psychological processes change with age.
9. I understand that I will receive monetary compensation for my participation. I further understand that the
primary costs I will incur as a result of participating in this research are in time spent with the interviewer -approximately one to four hours are required to complete all tasks.
10. I understand that my participation in this research study is voluntary, that my refusal to participate will involve
no penalty or loss of benefits to which I might be otherwise be entitled and that I may discontinue my participation
at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled.
11. I understand that the consequences of my decision to withdraw from the research study and the procedures for
orderly termination of my participation are: none.
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12. I understand that the anticipated circumstances under which my participation may be terminated by the
investigator without regard to my consent are: none.
13. I understand that significant new findings developed during the course of this research, which may relate to my
willingness to continue participation, will be provided to me.
14. I have had an opportunity to ask ____________________________ questions about the research project. I
understand that I may contact Dr. Sharon Mutter, Department of Psychology, (270) 745-4389, for additional
information about this research and for any questions I might have concerning the conduct of this study.
15. I have received a signed copy of this consent form.

Signature of Participant
Witness
Date and Time

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Paul Mooney, Human Protections Administrator
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652
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